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FOURTH AMENDMENT-STOP AND FRISK
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)
Just a decade ago, in Terry v. Ohio,1 the Warren
Court held that the legality of a policeman's war-
rantless 2 "stop and frisk" 3 search for weapons de-
pends on whether a reasonably prudent officer
'392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2 Any search carried out pursuant to a valid search
warrant (that is, one issued by judicial authority "upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person to be seized," U.S. CONsr. amend. IV) is per se
"reasonable." In the absence of a search warrant, a search
or seizure is "reasonable" only in certain limited situa-
tions: when the search is made 1) incidental to a lawful
"custodial arrest," United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1974) (a full body search may be conducted); 2)
with the consent of the person searched, Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (search is limited to the
scope of the consent): or 3) where special circumstances
justify a particular intrusion (limited according to the
requirements of the special circumstances). The last cat-
egory includes the following: a) "stop and frisk" searches
(see note 3 infra); b) other emergency searches where there
is compelling urgency to justify the failure to obtain a
warrant, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (evidence
would be lost or destroyed by delay); c) moving vehicle
searches where the inherent mobility of the automobile
creates an "exigent circumstance" of the removal or
destruction of evidence while a warrant is obtained,
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless
search must be based on probable cause to believe that
the vehicle contained something subject to seizure); cf.,
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (real
exigency must be shown to justify search of parked car
without warrant): d) border searches which may be
conducted without warrant at established checkpoints on
:he border, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. 428 U.S..
543 (1976), or the "functional equivalent" of the border,
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States. 413 U.S. 266 (1973):
but see United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975)
(searches by "roving patrols" twenty miles from the
border are not justified without warrant unless there is
some ground to suspect illegal activity), and United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (the fact
that occupants "looked Mexican" was not a sufficient
basis for suspicion of illegality to justify warrantless stop
of car on main highway leading from the border).
3 The "stop and frisk" search is one of the carefully
would be justified, given the circumstances of the
case, in believing that his safety or that of others is
endangered. The Court held that such a "stop and
frisk" would be permissible regardless of whether
the policeman has "probable cause ' 4 to arrest that
individual for a crime or an absolute certainty that
the individual is armed.5 During the most recent
term, the Burger Court issued a brief but important
per curiam decision, Pennsylvania v. Mimms6 (with
three dissenting opinions), which extends this Terry
"stop and frisk" right of a police officer to routine
traffic-violation situations. The Court in Mimms
held that a police officer may order a traffic viola-
tor out of his vehicle even when the officer has no
suspicion of danger in order to obtain more com-
plete information about the driver. Furthermore,
should the circumstances then raise a suspicion of
danger, the officer may "frisk" the driver.
8
limited warrantless searches permitted by the Court as
an exception to the usual fourth amendment rule that
"probable cause" is required as justification (see note 4
infra). The "stop and frisk" is based upon the special
circumstance of apparent danger to the police officer or
others and is limited to a pat down of the outer clothing
for weapons which may be seized if discovered. Only
after the person frisked has been placed under arrest may
a more thorough search be conducted. Adams v. Wil-
liams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Teny, 392 U.S. at 29 (1968).
4 The normal fourth amendment rule is that warrant-
less searches are permitted by police officers only when
there is "probable cause" (the same judicial standard
under the fourth amendment for the issuance of a search
warrant) to believe that 1) a crime had been committed;
or 2) a crime was in the process of being committed; or
3) a crime was about to be committed. Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). See also Terry, 392 U.S. at
35-39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
5 392 U.S. at 20-27.
6 434 U.S. 106 (1977).7 Justice Marshall dissented in a separate opinion, id
at 112; Justice Stevens dissented in an opinion joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, id. at 115.8 Id. at 110-12.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Because the facts of the Mimms case are analo-
gous in many respects to those in Terry, the recent
case makes possible an analysis of the current
Burger Court's approach to constitutional ques-
tions of criminal law and procedure as contrasted
with the approach of its immediate predecessor.9
The central question, then, is whether the decision
in Mimms is consistent with that in Terry in both
form and spirit. A secondary, but equally interest-
ing, issue presented in Mimms is one that frequently
arises in the area of criminal justice where federal
constitutional principles control law which is pri-
marily of state origin. It involves the question of
the Court's jurisdiction to review state court opin-
ions under both the Supreme Court's own long-
established principles and the Burger Court's spe-
cial concern for state court independence."'
In Mimms, the Supreme Court took the contro-
versial step" of simultaneously granting the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania's request for certiorari
and deciding the case on its merits.1 2 In deciding
the case, the Court reversed the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's judgment13 interpreting the fourth
s Some change or adaptation by the Court was inevi-
table according to the late Alexander M. Bickel:
The true secret of the Court's survival is not, cer-
tainly, that in the universe of change it has been
possessed of more permanent truth than other insti-
tutions, but rather that its authority, although as-
serted in absolute terms, is in practice limited and
ambivalent, and with respect to any given enterprise
or field of policy, temporary. In this accommodation,
the Court endures. But only in this accommodation.
For, by right, the idea of progress is common prop-
erty.
A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PRO-
GRIS 181 (1970).
"This issue is phrased by Justice Marshall as the
"institutional aspects of the Court's decision." 434 U.S.
at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"Considerable controversy surrounds the Supreme
Court practice of handling certiorari requests by sum-
marily disposing of cases on the merits, in brief per
curiam opinions. See 69 HARV. L. REv. 707 (1956), and
Brown, Foreword-The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARV.
L. REv. 77 (1958). While this procedure is controversial,
it is by no means uncommon. A former law clerk to a
Supreme Court justice has written that:
[S]ometimes when further argument would be of
little assistance in deciding the merits, a petition is
granted and the Court disposes of the merits in the
same conference, foregoing oral argument and acting
without the benefit of full briefs, provided a majority
so votes and fewer than four believe the issue war-
rants plenary consideration.
Alsup, A Policy Assessment of the National Court of Appeals,
25 HAsT. L.J. 1313, 1318 (1974).
12 434 U.S. at 112.
13 Commonwealth v. Mimms, 471 Pa. 546, 370 A.2d
1157 (1977).
amendment of the United States Constitution 4
without giving the Pennsylvania court an oppor-
tunity to consider whether there were sufficient
independent state grounds for its decision. 5 The
Court held that a policeman may, without violat-
ing the fourth amendment's prohibition of unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, order a driver out of
his car in conjunction with a routine traffic-viola-
tion stop, no matter how innocuous the violation
and even though the officer has no reason to suspect
danger. Once the driver has emerged, if a prudent
officer would consider him dangerous, the driver
may be subjected to a pat-down search.16
As a result of such a search, Mimms was con-
victed of carrying a concealed deadly weapon and
a firearm without a license.' 7 At the state trial, the
jury determined the facts' to be these: Two Phil-
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated..." The fourth amendment is applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
15 Justices Stevens and Marshall based their dissents
(in part) on this fact as well as upon the fact that the
case was not fully argued and briefed before the Court.
434 U.S. at 114-17. See text accompanying notes 41-60
infta for further discussion of their criticisms.
16434 U.S. at 110-12.
"7 The incident occurred on Sept. 7, 1970, and Mimms
was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadel-
phia County, on March 15, 1972. Commonwealth v.
Mimms, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 486, 488-92, 335 A.2d 516,
517-19 (1975).
18 The facts were "not in dispute" in the United States
Supreme Court. 434 U.S. at 107. However, the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania made it clear in its opinion that
the accounts of the defendant and his companion (who
pled guilty to a charge of carrying a concealed weapon)
and those of the police officers as to the discovery of the
weapons were completely at odds: "The appellant con-
tended that the gun was found in the car, while the police
testified that they took the gun from his person. It is
evident that the jury believed the testimony of the Com-
monwealth." 232 Pa. Super. Ct. at 491-92, 335 A.2d at
519.
Incidentally, the jury's determination was tainted by
the prosecutor's reference, in cross-examination of
Mimm's companion, to the religious affiliation (Black
Muslim) of Mimms and the companion in an attempt to
discredit their testimony. Although the superior court
majority held that such questioning was not reversible
error, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. at 491, 335 A.2d at 518, this
issue raised serious questions in the dissenting opinions in
the superior court and in the concurring opinions in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See notes 23, 37 infira.
If the jury had believed Mimm's account of the dis-
covery of the weapons inside the auto, that search would
clearly have violated accepted rules under both the
United States Constitution and Pennsylvania law. In
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Supreme
1978]
STOP AND FRISK
adelphia police officers observed Mimms driving
an automobile with an expired license plate and
stopped the car to issue a traffic summons. As was
his habit in every traffic stop, one of the officers
(Kurtz) asked Mimms to get out of his car. Once
Mimms was out of the car, Kurtz noticed a large
bulge under Mimms' sports jacket, feared it might
be a weapon, and frisked him. Thus Officer Kurtz
discovered the evidence which convicted Mimms
-a .38 caliber revolver with five rounds of am-
munition.'
9
FsIRST APPEAL IN PENNSYLVANIA
On his first appeal in Pennsylvania, Mimms'
state jury conviction was affirmed on the grounds
that his arrest situation was virtually identical to
that of the defendant in Terry v. Ohio and that the
Terry rule justifying a "stop and frisk" search to
insure the safety of the officer should apply.20 The
Superior Court of Pennsylvania did not even ad-
dress the issue of whether the officer should have
been permitted to order the driver out of the car in
the first place. Instead, this was almost assumed by
the court to be a police prerogative:
[WIhen, as in the instant case, a police officer in the
performance of his duty stops a car to enforce a
traffic violation for failure to have a current license
tag, and when requesting the driver to step out of
the car and exhibit his owner's card and driver's
license, he becomes aware of a situation that may
prove dangerous to his person, his right to frisk to
remove the danger, arises...
The narrow basis of the frisk and search was
strictly and solely for the officer's own protection.
Such searches are encouraged by the Supreme Court
of the United States for the protection of law en-
forcement officers. Terry v. Ohio, supra, Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) .... 21
Judge Watkins, in the opinion for the superior
court, noted that "the only reason that the car was
stopped was the absence of a current license
plate."2 2 Nonetheless, as long as the search itself
was not "whimsical," nor the subject of an "ill-
founded hunch" on the part of the officer, nor
"harrassment in any sense" it could be justified
Court permitted a warrantless search of an auto at the
place seized or back at the police station, only if there was
probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained
evidence of a crime. Accord, Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925). For a similar Pennsylvania rule, see
Commonwealth v. Dussell, 439 Pa. 392 (1972).
19 434 U.S. at 107.
20 232 Pa. Super. Ct. at 489-90, 335 A.2d at 517-18.
21 Id. at 490, 335 A.2d at 518.
22id.
under the Terry "stop and frisk" doctrine.2 3 The
three dissenters in the superior court urged a new
trial for Mimms based on unrelated grounds.23
JUDGMENT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, unlike the
superior court, seized upon the police officer's ini-
tial order to the driver to get out of the car. The
court found this to be a questionable procedure in
the absence of reasonable suspicion of danger. As
the court noted:
The precise point of our inquiry must be whether
Officer Kurtz's action was justified at its inception.
[Citation to Terry v. Ohio.] ... The initiation of
Officer Kurtz's intrusive action was the order [to
defendant] to get out of his car. If that order cannot
be constitutionally justified, then the fruits of the
resulting frisk were likewise unconstitutionally ob-
tained.2 5
According to this court, therefore, the frisking of
Mimms after the officer noticed the bulge consti-
tuted a violation of his fourth amendment rights.
Reversal of Mimms' conviction was thus required
despite the similarity of his case to the "stop and
frisk" situation of Terry.26 The traffic violation did
not supply the probable cause needed under federal
constitutional rules to justify the search of the
24 Id. at 492-96, 335 A.2d at 519-21. Judge Hoffman,
writing a dissenting opinion for himself and Judges Ja-
cobs and Spaeth took issue with the majority's holding
that the questioning of one of the witnesses regarding his
religious affiliation did not constitute reversible error. See
note 18 supra. The majority took the view that since
Mimms' counsel had, on re-direct examination, made the
point that adherents of the Black Muslim sect have an
obligation to testify truthfully, the question was not fatal
error. The dissenters, however, believed that any ques-
tioning of a witness concerning his religious beliefs vio-
lated the legislative provision that "no witness shall be
questioned, in any judicial proceeding, concerning his
religious belief; nor shall any evidence be heard upon the
subject for the purpose of affecting either his competency
or credibility." 28 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 313 (Purdon
1958). Moreover, according to the dissenters, defense
counsel's solicitation of the fact that Black Muslims are
under an obligation to tell the truth "was only an attempt
to minimize the effects of the Commonwealth's improper
cross-examination." 232 Pa. Super. Ct. at 495 n.6, 335
A.2d at 520 n.6. The majority of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reserved judgment on the issue, although
two members of that court who disagreed with the ma-
jority's holding on the search and seizure issue, concurred
in the majority's judgment on the basis of the prosecutor's
improper examination. See note 38 infra.
'
0 Commonwealth v. Mimms, 471 Pa. 546, 552, 380
A.2d 1157, 1160 (1977).26 Id. at 552, 370 A.2d at 1159.
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
occupants of the vehicle.27 In fact, the court stated
that only a nearly perfect fit to the Teny situation
could justify the order out of the vehicle:
The exigencies of face-to-face street confrontations
may require police response even when probable
cause to search or to seize property is lacking....
The Court held [in Teny] ... that such "carefully
limited searches" are reasonable within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment in certain narrow cir-
cumstances.... The Court made it clear that "in
justifying the particular intrusions the police officers
must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from these facts reasonably warrant the intrusion."02
Applying this requirement to the police officer's
order to Mimms, the state supreme court said:-
"The question before us, then, is whether Officer
Kurtz has been able to point to such 'specific and
articulable facts'.... Certainly the fact that a
weapon was discovered as a result of the search
cannot serve as its justification."' '
At this point in its opinion, the court's argument
weakened because of the court's reliance on a 1973
case, Commonwealth v. Pollard33 Justice Pomoroy,
writing for the Mimms court, cited the Pollard case,
in which the court held that a police officer did
not have the right to order a passenger out of a car
after it had been stopped for going through a red
light. Justice Pomoroy used Pollard as the basis for
his holding that the police officer likewise did not
have the right to order the driver out, at least in
the absence of "observable facts to support a sus-
picion that criminal activity was afoot or that the
occupants of the vehicle posed a threat to police
safety." 31 However, as Justice Nix noted in his
concurring opinion,3 2 this use of Pollard:
27 See note 18 supra.
28471 Pa. at 550-51, 370 A.2d at 1159-60 (quoting
Ter, 392 U.S. at 21).
Id at 552, 370 A.2d at 1160.
3 450 Pa. 138, 299 A.2d 233 (1973).
31471 Pa. at 552, 370 A.2d at 1160. As the majority
noted:
Officer Kurtz could point to no such observable
facts. He testified that he did not see the bulge under
appellant's coat until after appellant had stepped
out of the car, and that there was nothing unusual
or suspicious about the behavior of Mimms or his
passenger which led Kurtz to issue his order. Rather,
the officer indicated that it is his practice to order all
drivers out of their vehicles whenever he makes a
stop for a traffic violation and that the order was
issued to appellant solely because of this practice.
Id.
3471 Pa. at 555 n.l, 370 A.2d at 1161 n.1 (Nix, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Brien joined in Justice Nix's con-
currence.
is tenuous at best. Our holding in that case was
clearly limited to passengers occupying a vehicle....
The majority in the case at bar ignores this distinc-
tion and thus completely overlooks the question left
open in Pollard of whether an operator's expectation
of privacy differs from that of an occupant of a
vehicle detained for a traffic violation.
3 3
Justice Nix differed from the majority in his view
of the balance between the public interest and an
individual's rights relating to whether the evidence
obtained by the frisk was tainted by the police
officer's order to the driver to get out of the car.
According to Nix:
The application of... [the Supreme Court's] bal-
ancing test to the instant facts yields the conclusion
that Officer Kurtz's action was reasonable. The
intrusion occurred by requiring appellant to step
out of the vehicle was minimal. Appellant had in
fact already been "seized." He was properly de-
tained by Officer Kurtz for a violation of the Motor
Vehicle Code. Appellant's freedom of movement
was thus lawfully restricted until the officer had
finished his business. Requiring a motorist to leave
his vehicle under the circumstances is, in my view,
of no constitutional moment?'
Justice Nix next cited People v. Wolf to support
his notion that Mimms involved a reasonable and
"minimal" intrusion of the defendant's privacy. In
Wolf, the Supreme Court of Illinois had upheld the
introduction of evidence obtained by a state police
officer who had opened the door of a vehicle
detained because its license plate was fastened with
wire. This "minimal" 36 intrusion was held not in-
consistent with the fourth amendment. Since
Mimms was detained for having an expired license
plate, according to Justice Nix, Officer Kurtz
would have been "justified in opening appellant's
door to inspect the vehicle identification. In my
view, the difference, if any, in the 'degree of intru-
sion' occasioned by this type of conduct and that
instantly held invalid is constitutionally insignifi-
cant. 37 Justices Nix and O'Brien concurred with
33 id
34Id at 554, 370 A.2d at 1161 (Nix, J., concurring)
(citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. 873,
878 (1975)). See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523,536-37 (1967). The balancing test whichJustice
Nix discusses is a United States Supreme Court doctrine.
35 60 Ill. 2d 230, 326 N.E.2d 766, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
946 (1975).





the majority, however, on unrelated grounds.3sJus-
tice Jones dissented without a written opinion.ss
SUPREME COURT ISSUES AN APPARENT ADVISORY
OPINION
Seemingly, the Terry decision is a very malleable
instrument; several different Pennsylvania judges
were able to see different things in that opinion to
support their own approaches to the Mimms case.
Perhaps a desire to clear up the uncertainties of
Terry explains the alacrity with which the United
State Supreme Court took and decided the Mimms
case.
40 Justice Marshall, in his dissent, pointed out
that the Court considered Mimms "solely on the
basis of certiorari papers and in the process sum-
marily reverse[d] the considered judgment of Penn-
sylvania's highest court," and that "[sluch a dis-
position cannot engender respect for the work of
this Court. 41 More than just the lack of a complete
hearing,4 2 however, is involved in the speed with
which the Court acted in Mimms. As Justice Ste-
vens3 noted, there were three different jurisdic-
tional reasons which made the grant of certiorari
extremely questionable in this case. In its speed,
Justice Stevens asserted, the Court disregarded the
facts that the case "barely escapes mootness" 44
1 Id. at 555-57, 370 A.2d at 1162-63 (Nix, J., concur-
ring). Justices Nix and O'Brien agreed with Judges Hoff-
man, Jacobs, and Spaeth of the superior court that the
prosecutor's questioning about the defendant's religious
affiliation constituted prejudicial error requiring a new
trial:
We have stated that no verdict which may have
been brought about or even influenced by a litigant's
religious affiliations should be permitted in a court
ofjustice. [Citations omitted.] This is particularly so
where, as here, the religious affiliation placed before
the jury is that of a highly controversial and exten-
sively publicized group like the Black Muslims.
Id. at 557, 370 A.2d at 1163.
Id. at 553, 370 A.2d at 1161.
4The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the case
on February 28, 1977; rehearing was denied before that
court on March 28, 1977. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and decided the case on Decem-
ber 5, 1977.
4, 434 U.S. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42Id. at 114.
43 Id. at 115-24. (Stevens, J., dissenting). He was joined
by Justices Marshall and Brennan.
4Id. at 116 n.4. The Court discussed the mootness
issue and pointed out that even though a sentence has
been served, there is always the "possibility of a criminal
defendant suffering 'collateral legal consequences' from
a sentence already served permitting him to have his
claims reviewed here on the merits." Id. at 108 n.3.
Collateral legal consequences stem from repeat offender
statutes and statutes whieh bar ex-convicts from certain
since Mimms had already served his sentence;' 5
that Mimms' conviction might well be reversed on
different grounds on remand to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court;4 6 and that "the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court may still construe its own constitution
to prohibit what it described as the 'indiscriminate
procedure' of ordering all traffic offenders out of
their vehicles."
47
The jurisdictional points made by Justice Ste-
vens and by Justice Marshall in dissent were prob-
ably the strongest arguments against the grant of
certiorari in Mimmns. The doctrine of "adequate
state grounds" and the importance of maintaining
comity in the federal system provide the basis for
this argument. This doctrine was discussed by Jus-
tice Jackson for the Court in a much earlier case,
where he recognized that:
This Court from the time of its foundation has
adhered to the principle that it will not review
judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and
independent state grounds. [Citations omitted.] The
reason is so obvious that it has rarely been thought
to warrant statement. It is found in the partitioning
of power between the state and federal judicial
systems and in the limitations of our own jurisdic-
tion. Our only power over state judgments is to
correct them to the extent that they incorrectly
adjudge federal rights. And our power is to correct
wrongjudgments, not to revise opinions. We are not
permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the
same judgment would be rendered by the state
court after we corrected its-view of federal laws, our
review would amount to nothing more than an
advisory opinion.48
Was the Court's decision in Mimms an advisory
opinion, that is, an "extrajudicial deciding [of a]
question"? 49 State courts may prevent Supreme
Court review of their cases by holding a contested
state statute or procedure invalid under the" state
employment. The Mimms case was therefore not consid-
ered moot.
4 Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46"Two members of the [Pennsylvania Supreme
Clourt were persuaded that introducing testimony about
Mimms' Muslim religious beliefs was prejudicial error,
and three others specifically reserved the issue. Common-
wealth v. Mimms, 370 A.2d 1157, 1158 n.2, and
1162-63." 434 U.S. at 116 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See also id at 114 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).47 Id. at 117 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48 Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).
49John Jay, Chief Justice, United States Supreme
Court, Letter to President Washington, 1793, quoted in A.




constitution5w as well as under the federal consti-
tution."1 Furthermore, the Court has noted that
"a state is free as a matter of its own law to impose a
greater restriction on police activity than those this
Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitu-
tional standards. 52 Indeed, state courts have some-
times refused to follow Supreme Court decisions
and applied stricter requirements as a matter of
state constitutional law, thus avoiding review.ss
The California Supreme Court, for instance, re-
cently reaffirmed "the independent nature of the
California constitution and our responsibility to
define separately and protect the rights of Califor-
nia citizens despite conflicting decisions of the
United State Supreme Court interpreting the fed-
eral Constitution."
U
It seems fairly clear in Mimms that the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court relied on the fourth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution rather than
upon its counterpart in the Pennsylvania consti-
tution.s In fact, the state court's Mimms opinion
did not mention the state's own constitution at all.
But, suppose for the sake of argument that there
was a question as to the grounds upon which the
Pennsylvania court had relied. To resolve such a
question the Supreme Court might have either
relied on a certificate from the state court5 or
vacated and remanded the case to the state court
50 The Pennsylvania counterpart to the fourth amend-
ment is PA. CoNsT. art. I, § 8:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and possessions from unreasonable searches
and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or
to seize any person or things shall issue without
describing them as nearly as may be, nor without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation
subscribed to by the affiant.
s1 See, e.g., Dept. of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S.
425 (1973).
52 Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
63Justice Stevens, 434 U.S. at 117 n.6, noted the
following case as an example: State v. Opperman, 228
N.W.2d 152 (S.D. 1975), rev'd, South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), judgment reinstated under
state constitution, State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673
(S.D.).
4People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 114-15,545 P.2d
272, (1976). The California Supre-me Court held that
Harris v. New York, 461 U.S. 222 (1971) (holding that
statements obtained in violation of the Miranda rule
were admissible for purposes of impeachment) "is not
persuasive authority in any state prosecution in Califor-
nia." Id at 113, 545 P.2d at 272.
5 See note 50 supra.
'See, e.g., Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S.
20, 22 (1974), where the Court accepted as determinative
of a similar issue a certificate by the chief justice of the
state court.
for determination of the basis for the decision.5 7 In
Mimms, the Supreme Court did neither. Hence, in
its haste to clarify the Terry ruling, the Court
appeared to violate its long-held canon against
issuing advisory opinions.-; Here, the impropriety
of an advisory opinion is underscored by the ne-
cessity, in a federal system, of maintaining respect
between state and federal judiciaries. It is some-
what ironic that this Court so quickly entered the
fray here, given the Burger Court's concern in
habeas corpus proceedings for restoring state court
independence from federal interference.5 " In ha-
beas proceedings, "considerations of comity and
federalism"'  are given great consideration. Other
considerations of great import must, therefore, exist
here for the Court to have so easily disregarded
those considerations in Mimms, as well as its tradi-
tional self-imposed restriction against advisory
opinions.
REASONING OF THE COURT
The overriding consideration which led the six-
member majority in Mimms to take and decide a
case involving a "stop and frisk" search in a traffic-
violation situation was apparently "a legitimate
concern about the safety of police officers through-
out the Nation.""5 Given the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's belief that Terry requires the exclu-
sion of evidenceS2 obtained pursuant to a police
officer's search of a seemingly harmless driver or-
dered out of his car during a routine traffic offense,
the Court was presented with an opportunity to
express its own view of the balance between the
public interest and an individual's rights in the
Mimms situation.63 Indeed, the Court seized upon
this case to demonstrate its concern for the police
5 ee, e.g., Dept. of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S.
425 (1973). See also Note, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 822 (1962).
58 Ever since 1793 when Chief Justice John Jay and
his associates informed President Washington that "in
consideration of the lines of separation drawn by the
Constitution between the three departments of Govern-
ment and being judges of a court of last resort afford
strong arguments against the propriety of extra-judicial
deciding questions from executive or legislative
branches," the Court has refused to give advisory opin-
ions. Letter of John Jay is reprinted and discussed in A.
SAYE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES AND COMMENTS 29-30
(1965).
9 See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
60 Id at 541.
61434 U.S. at 117 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62 471 Pa. 546, 370 A.2d 1157. Evidence obtained by
illegal search and seizure cannot be used in a criminal
proceeding against the victim of the search and seizure.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
63 See note 34 supra.
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officer's safety, a concern that, for the majority,
made the weighing of values very simple:
We think it too plain for argument that the state's
proffered justification-the safety of the officer-is
both legitimate and weighty. "Certainly it would be
unreasonable to require that police officers take
unnecessary risks in the performance of their du-
ties ... " And we have specifically recognized the
inordinate risk confronting an officer as he ap-
proaches a person seated in an automobile.... In-
deed, it appears "that a significant percentage of
murders of police officers occurs when the officers
are making traffic stops." 64
Hence, for the Court, the safety factor sufficiently
tips the balance against the individual motorist's
privacy rights in favor of the police officer's right
to order a driver out of his vehicle during a traffic-
violation stop.
Addressing the contention of Pennsylvania's
highest court that the officer's order to Mimms was
an "impermissible" seizure because the "officer
could not point to 'objective observable facts to
support a suspicion that criminal activity was afoot
or that the occupant of the vehicle posed a threat
to police safety,"' the Court quite simply disa-
greed.s Such a result, according to the Court,
would be "unreasonable" and, therefore, inconsist-
ent with the Terry rationale that the fourth amend-
ment's "touchstone" is the "reasonableness in all
the circumstances of the particular governmental
invasion of a citizen's personal security." 66 Since
Mimms was lawfully stopped for driving with ex-
pired license tags in violation of the Pennsylvania
Motor Vehicle Code, the question of whether the
police officer's order was legal hinged, according to
the Court, on whether the "incremental intrusion
resulting from the request to get out of the car once
the vehicle was lawfully stopped" 67 could be justi-
fied as a "precautionary measure to afford a degree
of protection to the officer." 6 For the Court, the
answer to this question was obviously "yes." As the
Court reasoned, ordering the driver out of the car
"reduces the likelihood that the officer will be the
victim of an assault. ' ' 69
In his dissent, Justice Stevens claimed that ex-
perts in the field of police science do not agree as
to whether ordering a driver out of a car in a
64 434 U.S. at 110 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 23, and
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 234 n.5).
6n 434 U.S. at 108.
66 Id (quoting Teny, 392 U.S. at 19).
67 434 U.S. at 108.
6aId. at 110.
6 Id.
traffic-violation stop is actually a safety measure at
all. He noted that the Court's decision was based
on "a factual assumption about police safety that
is dubious at best."70 Thus, the Court's major
assumption underlying its weighting of the public
interest in the fourth amendment balancing test
was considered possibly fallacious. Moreover, Jus-
tice Stevens recognized that the Court's view of the
balancing test in fourth amendment cases is illu-
sory, since by the Court's standard the public
interest would almost always outweigh the individ-
ual's interests. He claimed that:
I share that concern [for the safety of police officers]
and am acutely aware that almost every decision of
this Court holding that an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights have been invaded makes law
enforcement somewhat more difficult and hazard-
ous. That, however, is not a sufficient reason for this
Court to reach out to decide every new Fourth
Amendment issue as promptly as possible.
7
1
On the individual's side of the fourth amend-
ment balance, the majority had considered the
order to get out of the car as:
an additional intrusion [which] can only be decided
as de minimus.... Not only is the insistence of the
police [that the driver get out] ... not a "serious
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person," but it
hardly rises to the level of a "petty indignity ... "
What is at most a mere inconvenience cannot pre-
vail when balanced against legitimate concerns for
the officer's safety.T2
However, Justice Stevens noted in dissent that the
Court's abstract model of the individual's rights is
also not without problems. The establishment of a
general rule to apply in all cases cannot take
account of the millions of variations in individual
traffic stops: "Whether viewed from the standpoint
of the officer's interest in his own safety or of the
citizen's interest in not being required to obey an
arbitrary command, it is perfectly obvious that the
millions of traffic stops that occur every year are
not fungible."73 Hence, according to Justice Ste-
vens, what is required to legitimize a "stop and
frisk" search (including the police order to get out
of the car) in a traffic violation as in other situations
is an "individualized inquiry into the reason for
each intrusion or some comparable guarantee
70 Id. at 117 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See especially id at
119-20 n. 10.
71 Id. at 117 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7lad at 111 (quoting Terry, 342 U.S. at 17).
3 Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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against arbitrary harrassment." 7' This he con-
tended had been the rule under the fourth amend-
ment until the change instituted by the Court in
Mimms. The biggest problem, according to Justice
Stevens, with the Mimms Court's willingness to
"leave police discretion utterly without limits"75 is
the discriminatory potential such unchecked power
contains: "Some citizens will be subjected to this
minor indignity while others-perhaps those with
more expensive cars, or different bumper stickers,
.or different colored skin-may escape it entirely."
76
Once the Court majority had dispensed with the
difficulty over the policeman's order to the driver,
the frisk itself could easily be justified: "We have
as little doubt on this point as on the first; the
answer is controlled by Terry v. Ohio.... There is
little question that the officer was justified.... In
these circumstances, any man of 'reasonable cau-
tion' would likely have conducted the 'pat-
down." '77 But Justice Marshall, in his dissent, ob-
served that the Court had created and justified a
three-part "stop-order out of vehicle-and frisk"
search on the authority of the Terry two-part "stop
and frisk" search. Under the Terry rule both parts
of the "stop and frisk" must be justified by "the
probability, not only that a crime was about to be
committed, but also that the crime 'would be likely
to involve the use of weapons."' 78 Yet, in Mimrms,
the Court permitted the initial "stop" to be one for
an innocuous traffic violation and allowed an order
to get out of the car which is not justified by
observable suspicion of danger at all, an order then
followed by the "frisk" which is, admittedly, trig-
gered by a justifiable suspicion of danger. Under
Terry, according to Justice Marshall, both the
"stop" and the "frisk" must be justified by "indi-
vidualized reason to fear" the person searched. 9
Since in Mimrs "the officer did not have even the
slightest hint, prior to ordering respondent out of
the car, that [he] might have a gun," the Mimms
"stop and frisk" was not justified under the Terry
rule and the Mimms ruling is, therefore, a radical
"depart[ure] from the teachings of Terry v. Ohio.' 's
As noted by dissenting Justice Marshall:
Such a result cannot be explained by Terry, which
limited the nature of the intrusion by reference to
the reason for the stop. The Court held that "the
4i d.
75 at 122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).78Id.
7Id at 112.Id at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
soId.
officer's action [must be] reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place." [Citation omitted.] In Terry there
was an obvious connection emphasized by the Court
... between the officer's suspicion that an armed
robbery was being planned and his frisk for
weapons. In the instant case .... [t]here is simply
no relation at all between that circumstance [an




MIMMS AND TERRY COMPARED
Is Justice Marshall correct that the decision in
Mimms is a great departure from the holding in
Terry? And is Justice Stevens making "much ado
about nothing" over the Miims authorization of a
police officer's order to a driver to get out of his
car-an order Stevens refers to as "a major cate-
gory of police seizures"?ss A brief review of the
"stop and frisk"decisions of the Court and their
relationship to Mimms may help to answer these
questions. The initial and leading decision is, of
course, Terry v. Ohio. The similarities and differences
between the situations and the holdings in Terry
and Mimms suggest that the two decisions are con-
sistent in form (Justice Marshall's dissenting opin-
ion in Mimms to the contrary notwithstanding) but
poles apart -in spirit (as Justice Stevens' dissenting
opinion in Mimms, implies).
The Court in Terry relied on the police officer's
lengthy observation of suspicious activity8" by the
man he searched to justify both the "stop" and the
"frisk."s' In Mimms, the Court again required spe-
cific justification for each part of the "stop and
frisk" which occurred. Here the "stop" (both the
initial stop of the vehicle and the order out of the
car) was justified by one occurrence (the traffic
violation), and the "frisk" was justified by another
(the observable bulge under the sport coat which
would lead a prudent officer to suspect danger even
if he had not previously been suspicious of the drivernS).
81d at 113-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
82Id at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I question the
need to eliminate the requirement of an articulable jus-
tification in each case and to authorize the indiscriminate
invasion of the liberty of every citizen stopped for a traffic
violation, no matter how petty." [Emphasis added] Id. at
123.).
8 "[Hle suspected the two men of 'casing ajob, a stick-
up' and ... he feared 'they may have a gun."' 392 U.S.
at 6.
' Id at 28. In Terry, unlike Mimms, there was no
observable "bulge" resembling a firearm protruding from
the suspect's belt. 392 U.S. at 7.
s In Terry, unlike Mimms, the police officer actually
had no certain knowledge of any violation of the law by
the suspects. Id. at 7, 28.
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Moreover, in both Terry and Mimms, the justifica-
tion for the actual invasion of the individual's
security was a legitimate concern, for the safety of
the police officer.86 Finally, in both cases there is
an emphasis on the need to limit the scope of the
invasion to that required for the officer's safety. In
Terry, what was permitted, given the justifiable
suspicion of danger, was a confrontation and brief
pat-down search;8 7 in Mimms, what was permitted,
given the actual traffic violation, was the stopping
of the vehicle and ordering of the driver out, to be
followed by a pat-down search only if, as in Mimms,
there is observable danger. Hence, in form, the
decisions are consistent.
However, the spirit in which the decisions were
written is not nearly so compatible. In Terry, the
Court refused to grant a general authorization to
the police to conduct "stop and frisk" searches free
from judicial scrutiny:
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes
meaningful only when it is assured that at some
point the conduct of those charged with enforcing
the laws can be subjected to the more detached,
neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in
light of the particular circumstances.[Emphasis
added.]'
Although the Mimms Court did not change this
requirement ofjudicial scrutiny regarding the frisk
"search," it was willing to establish a general rule
permitting the police a discretionary "seizure" of
any driver who has committed a traffic violation,
although he is not arrested,ss by ordering him out
of his car. This change in attitude by the Mimms
Court demonstrates confidence that the nation's
8 "There is the more immediate interest of the police
officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that




89 434 U.S. at 111. An interesting question arises from
the fact that there is no right to search a motorist's person
or car when a police officer issues a citation to appear in
court. Would this encourage more custodial arrests for
minor offenses? In practice, such a development has not
been widespread. While there are no Supreme Court
cases which assert any limitation on taking persons into
custody for matters such as minor traffic offenses; evi-
dence has been suppressed in lower federal courts upon
a showing that a desire to seek such evidence was the
motivation behind arrest for such minor crimes as va-
grancy, Green v. United States, 386 F.2d 953 (10th Cir.
1967), or a traffic violation, Gonzales v. United States,
391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968).
police forces will not misuse their discretionary
powers. At the same time, Mimms exhibits much
less concern for individual rights than did Terry.
The Terry Court stressed the importance of individ-
ual liberty in relation to "stop and frisk" searches
even as they upheld a police search. As that Court
noted, even a limited search "of the outer clothes
for weapons constitutes a severe, though brieT, in-
trusion upon cherished personal security, and it
must surely be an annoying, frightening, and per-
haps humiliating experience."
' 90
The Mimms Court, on the other hand, empha-
sized the "de minimus" nature of the intrusion
caused by ordering a driver out of his car. While
one may accept the fact that such an intrusion is
necessary for the safety of police officers who con-
front harmful as well as harmless individuals each
day, this change in attitude regarding the possibil-
ity of police violation of individaal rights must be
noted with misgiving as the greatest difference
between the Warren Court's decision in Terry and
the Burger Court's decision in Mfimms.9 '
Adams v. Williams,2 the transitional "stop and
frisk" case between Terry and Mimms, was decided
during the early years of the Burger Court. Written
by Justice Rehnquist, this decision for the first time
carried over the "stop and frisk" rationale to vehi-
cle stops and gave a good indication of the direction
which the Court would take in this area of the law.
In Adams, a police officer acting on an informant's
tip approached the occupant of a vehicle and
requested the driver to get out. Instead, the occu-
pant rolled down the window and the officer con-
ducted a frisk through the window, uncovering a
weapon where the informant had said it would
be.93 The defendant's argument that only personal
90 392 U.S. at 24-25.
" Cf., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 41 (1968). In this
companion case to Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court
consolidated two Terry-like situations where the "stop and
frisk" resulted in evidence used to convict appellants. In
-one case, a police officer had observed one of the defend-
ants in conversation with known narcotics addicts over a
long period of time. However, the officer saw nothing
pass between the men and did not overhear their conver-
sations. His warrantless search through defendant's pock-
ets based on this observation alone was held to constitute
an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth
amendment. In the second case, a police officer had
observed several individuals (unknown to him) acting
suspiciously inside his apartment building. His pat-down
search resulted in the discovery of burglar tools and was
held by the Court to be a valid "stop and frisk" based on
justifiable suspicion of criminal activity.




observation could legitimatize the "stop and frisk"
was rejected by the Court. As the Court main-
tained: "We reject respondent's argument that rea-
sonable cause for a stop and frisk can only be based
on the officer's personal observation, rather than
on information supplied by another person."
94
The Mimms decision followed Adams by five years
and did not significantly alter that holding. Once
the Adams Court had permitted a police officer to
stop a vehicle and make a frisk search based on an
informant's tip alone, it would not be difficult to
carry that logic (at least that part encompassing
the police officer's order that the driver get out of
the vehicle) over to every traffic-violation stop
which is potentiallyjust as dangerous to the officer.
DEVELOPMENTS AFrER MimMS
What does the Mimms decision mean for the
future development of the law of warrantless "stop
and frisk" searches and seizures? Several narrow
questions remain. These include questions such as
whether a police officer would be entitled to order
other occupants besides the driver out of a stopped
vehicle, or whether police officers may order drivers
out of their vehicles in the absence of a traffic
violation. Regarding the former question, Justice
Stevens' argument it dissent is convincing that
the Court's logic necessarily [also] encompasses the
passenger. This is true even though the passenger
has committed no traffic ofen... . [W]hen the
justification rests on nothing more than an assump-
tion about the danger associated with every
stop-no matter how trivial the offense-the new




If this Mimms ruling could be applied to an
occupant who has not committed a traffic viola-
tion, might not the order be applied to drivers even
in the absence of a traffic violation? In a recent
case, s one federal court of appeals relied on Mimms
to justify a police officer's order that two persons
94id at 147.
9 434 U.S. at 122-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Government of the Canal Zone v. Bender, 573 F.2d
1329, 1331 (5th Cir. 1978). Although the court said that
the order out of the vehicle was proper, they did not
admit evidence obtained from a search of the vehicle.
get out of their car so that the officer could question
them about their activities. 7 Another possible ram-
ification of Mimms involves the question of permit-
ting frisks of drivers even in the absence of observ-
able justification for a suspicion of danger. Mimms
still requires such observable justification prior to
the frisk though not prior to the order out of the
car. However, Justice Stevens noted in his Mimms
dissent that the safety rationale might be used to
carry the officer's right even this far.98
CONCLUSION
The Mimms decision fits almost perfectly the
form if not the spirit of the Terry decision, and it
follows the trend set by the Burger Court in the
area of warrantless stop and frisk searches. That
trend is to enlarge the rights of the police officer to
interfere with a driver's privacy rights. Since the
requirement of personal observation of suspicious
activity had been eliminated by the Court in the
Adams case, every potentially dangerous traffic stop
now presents a situation where the officer may
order the driver out of his vehicle, under the Mimms
rationale, for the officer's protection. While this
trend was not logically precluded by the Warren
Court's decision in the Terry case, it does represent
a considerably different view of the balance be-
tween the public interest and the individual's rights
involved in fourth amendment cases specifically
and criminal justice cases generally. Despite
Mimms, one hopes the Court will still continue to
recognize the imperative need of striking a fair and
reasonable balance between these interests.
97 "Most narrowly, the Court has simply held that
whenever an officer has occasion to speak with the driver
of a vehicle, he may also order the driver out of the car."
434 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see id- at I11
n.6 where the majority refutes this implication of Mimms.
96 According to Stevens:
If this new rule is truly predicated on a safety
rationale, ... it should also justify a search for
weapons, or at least an order directing the driver to
lean on the hood of the car with legs and arms
spread out. For unless such precautionary measures
are also taken, the added safety-if any-in having
the driver out of the car is of no value when a truly
dangerous offender happens to be caught.
434 U.S. at 123 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
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